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This paper studies a problem of non linear taxation when individuals have different 
longevities resulting from a non-monetary effort (like exercising). We first present the laissez-
faire and the first best. Like Becker and Philipson (1998), we find that the laissez-faire level 
of effort is too high compared with the first best, because individuals do not internalize the 
impact of survival on the return of their savings. We also claim that because of its non-
monetary form, effort is not contractible. That is why we modify our framework and assume, 
for the rest of the paper, that effort is determined by the individual while the social planner 
only allocates consumptions. It turns out that, under full information, a tax on the return of 
annuitized savings is desirable for both types. This tax is higher for the low-survival 
individual. Under asymmetric information, the low-survival individual still faces a tax while 
the high-survival individual might now face a positive or negative tax on annuities. 
Interestingly, our results depend on the value of life. 
JEL Code: H21, H23, H55, I12. 
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Is our life expectancy predetermined? To what extent can we inﬂuence it? Sev-
eral factors determine human longevity. It may depend on intrinsic characteris-
tics (such as gender or heredity) or on environmental and sociocultural factors.
However, individuals may also be able to inﬂuence their longevities by making
speciﬁc lifestyle choices. This can be achieved either through monetary invest-
ments (for example, undergoing expensive surgery) or through non-monetary
ones. In this latter case, health-improving eﬀort can equally be exercising, diet-
ing, living a healthy life, sleeping eight hours a night, etc... For instance, Kaplan
et al. (1987) show that little or no physical activity is associated with higher
mortality risks at all ages. In a more recent study, Okamoto (2006) also ﬁnds
a signiﬁcantly positive relationship between leisure time spent in sports and the
increase in life expectancy at 65 of Japanese men.1
Relating these questions to the current debates on Social Security, the fac-
tors inﬂuencing life duration and their consequences raise diﬃcult issues for
policy-makers. With regard to equity issues alone, several empirical studies (see
e.g. Coronado et al. 2000, Liebman 2001 and Bommier et al. 2006) ﬁnd that
longevity diﬀerentials reduce intra-generational redistribution since Social Secu-
rity systems provide an annuity which is independent of one’s life duration. For
instance, individuals with lower income obtain higher replacement rates, yet this
redistribution is partly neutralized owing to the positive correlation between life
expectancy and income. Consequently, longevity is one of the many dimensions,
other than productivity, which should be included in pension schemes.
From a theoretical perspective, the contributions of Bommier et al. (2007a,
b) discuss the optimal pension design when individuals have diﬀerent longevities,
which they assume to be exogenous. Under speciﬁc assumptions on individual
preferences, they conclude that, in the ﬁrst best optimum, short-lived individ-
uals should be compensated for their unluckiness by getting higher per period
1More evidence on the relationship between physical activity and longevity can also be found
in Ferucci et al. (1999), Franco et al. (2005, 2006).
2consumption and retiring earlier than long-lived individuals.2
In contrast, this paper studies a problem of optimal non linear taxation
in an economy where individuals have diﬀerent longevities as the result of a
private (and costly) eﬀort. We assume a two-period model in which surviving
to the second period is uncertain and depends on the level of eﬀort made in
the ﬁrst period. Individuals may yet diﬀer in their disutility from eﬀort so that
they end up with diﬀerent survival chances. Unlike Eeckhoudt and Pestieau
(2006) and Becker and Philipson (1998), we also assume that individuals’ eﬀort
takes a non-monetary form so that the social planner cannot inﬂuence it directly.
Finally, unlike Bommier et al. (2007a, b), individuals’ lifetime utility is additively
separable; we decided to retain this standard formulation in order to emphasize
the role of private eﬀorts on the optimal allocation.
Under these assumptions, we ﬁrst present the laissez-faire as a benchmark
case and second we study a (hypothetical) ﬁrst best problem in which the social
planner allocates consumptions and eﬀorts. The ensuing result is that the op-
timal level of eﬀort is smaller in the ﬁrst best than in the laissez-faire. This is
what we refer to as the Becker-Philipson eﬀect (referring to Becker and Philip-
son, 1998). In the laissez-faire, the individual invests too much in his longevity
because he only takes into account the direct impact of eﬀort on his survival
without considering its indirect impact on the return of his savings through a
lower annuity return. In order to solve this ineﬃciency, a tax on eﬀort would be
required, which, we claim, is not possible as eﬀort is non-monetary. This is why
in the following we resort to a framework in which eﬀort is non-contractible.
In this modiﬁed set-up, individuals choose their eﬀort level privately while
the social planner can inﬂuence it only through the allocation of consumptions.
Under full information, future consumption is always lower than present con-
sumption as a way to make individuals exert less eﬀort. We also demonstrate
that the optimal allocation transfers resources from low-survival individuals to-
2they also question the modeling of individual preferences, when individuals face diﬀerent
life durations. Following Bommier (2006a, b), they show that with preferences à la Yaari (1965),
individuals exhibit temporal risk neutrality, which leads to very speciﬁc and questionable con-
clusions in terms of redistribution. We will not discuss this point in the present paper.
3ward high-survival ones. Finally, we study the problem under asymmetric infor-
mation, when the social planner cannot observe disutility from eﬀort and eﬀort
levels. In this case, the distortion is identical to the full information one for the
low-survival individual so that it is still optimal to encourage early consump-
tion for this individual. On the other hand, for the high-survival individual, the
Becker-Philipson eﬀect and the incentive constraint act in opposite directions so
that future consumption may be preferred to early consumption in some cases.
Using a numerical example, we ﬁnd that the overall distortion for this individ-
ual crucially depends on the gap between individuals’ types and on the value
of a statistical life. We also study how to decentralize these optima through a
perfect annuity market and ﬁnd that a tax on annuity is always optimal under
full information with non-contractible eﬀort. Under asymmetric information, it
appears that a subsidy may be desirable in some cases for the individual with
low disutility of eﬀort as a way to relax the incentive constraint.
Interestingly, our paper states that, for reasons of eﬃciency, ﬁrst period con-
sumption should be preferred to second period consumption. This result appears
as a convincing argument in favor of the observed patterns of replacement rates
in actual Social Security systems. As shown by Gruber and Wise (1999), Social
Security systems typically provide replacement rates which are lower than one.3
Our theoretical model supports such a feature of the pension design, as a way
to limit longevity-enhancing behavior.
Finally, this paper is in line with the contribution of Sheshinski (2007) who
brieﬂy studies a similar problem. He showed that “under competition, there is
excessive investment in increasing survival probabilities” because “individuals
disregard the eﬀect of their investments in (longevity) on the equilibrium rate
of return on annuities”.4 Our paper might however complete his work as we
consider a special case of non-monetary investment in longevity; we also assume
a population with diﬀerent disutility from eﬀort so that our results are not only
about eﬃciency but also about equity.
3For example, they estimate that the replacement rate at early retirement age ranged from
20% in Canada to 91% in France and in the Netherlands.
4Chapter 7 pp.53 in “The economic theory of annuities”.
4This paper is constructed as follows. In Section 2, we present the model
and derive the laissez-faire and ﬁrst best problems. In Section 3, we present a
modiﬁed framework with full information and non-contractible eﬀort. Section
4 sets out the results under asymmetric information and presents a numerical
example. The last section concludes.
2 The Model
2.1 Assumptions
We consider a two-period model in which individuals live the ﬁrst period with
certainty and the second one with probability π(e) ∈ [0,1] with e being a private
eﬀort level. The survival probability π(.) takes the same form for all agents
with π′ (.) > 0, π′′ (.) < 0. We further assume that the elasticity of the survival
probability with respect to eﬀort, επ,e ≡ π′ (e)e/π(e), is decreasing with eﬀort.5
In our model, the individual’s eﬀort is made in ﬁrst period and is non-monetary
(such as exerting oneself in sport, dieting, living a healthy life) so that it does
not enter into the individual’s budget constraint. Exerting an eﬀort, however,
creates disutility which depends on the agent’s taste for eﬀort; this total utility
cost is represented by γe where γ represents the intensity of eﬀort disutility.
The economy is composed of two groups of individuals, indexed by i = 1,2
who have diﬀerent intensities of eﬀort disutility, γi. Each group represents a
proportion ni of the population. We assume that γ1 > γ2 so that type-1 in-
dividuals are “bad-type” individuals since they have high disutility from eﬀort
while type-2 individuals are “good-type” individuals. There is no other source
of heterogeneity and the initial wealth endowment w is exogenous and identical
for any individual.
The discount and interest rates are assumed to equal zero. The individual’s
lifetime welfare is additive over time and it depends on per period consumption
and on total eﬀort disutility. Assuming that the utility of being dead is normal-
ized to zero, the expected lifetime utility of an individual with disutility of eﬀort
5It is well known that in the case of physical activity, there is an optimal level of eﬀort above
which additional eﬀort may eﬀectively decrease the marginal gain from eﬀort. In Section 3, we
make more precise assumptions about the functional form of the survival function.
5γi is given by:
Ui (c,d,e) = u(c) + π (e)u(d) − γie (1)
where c and d denote the consumptions in ﬁrst and second period respectively.
Per period utility of consumption, u(.) is such that u′ (.) > 0 and u′′ (.) < 0.
We also introduce here the notion of value of life. We deﬁne it as the price
one would be ready to pay for an additional unit of life and we denote it V L(c)
in the rest of the paper. In Appendix A, we show that it is equal to
V L(c) =
u(c) − u′ (c)c
u′(c)
(2)
It is straightforward that V L(c) is always increasing in c. We also assume that
for all consumption levels that are considered we have cu′(c)/u(c) < 1, which
ensures that the value of life is always positive.6 At this stage, it is also important
to mention that there is no systematic correspondence between one’s disutility
from eﬀort and his value of life.7
2.2 The laissez-faire
We assume that individuals invest all their savings in a perfect annuity market.
An individual with type γi determines his savings si as well as his eﬀort ei by
solving the following problem:
max














ci = w − si
di = Risi

















6On the notion of the value of life, see Murphy and Topel (2006) and Becker et al. (2005).
7An individual may have both a higher disutility from eﬀort and a higher value of life.
8Under our assumptions, the Hessian of this problem is negative deﬁnite.
6The ﬁrst condition gives the trade-oﬀ between present and future consumptions.
Always assuming that insurers can perfectly observe individuals’ survival prob-
ability and that the market for annuities is actuarially fair, the return Ri from
the annuity is 1/π
 
ei 
. Then, u′  
ci 
= u′  
di 
and the individual’s consumption
is smoothed across periods.
Condition (3) deﬁnes the individual’s preferred level of eﬀort, which is de-
creasing in γi. It states that at the optimal level, the expected marginal utility
from increased life expectancy must be equal to marginal disutility from eﬀort.
Note that in the laissez-faire, the individual takes the annuity return as given so
that he does not internalize the impact of his eﬀort on the annuity return. This
imperfection was ﬁrst highlighted by Becker and Philipson (1998) who studied
the trade-oﬀ between the quantity (i.e. longer lifetime) and the quality (i.e.
fewer resources per period) of life and how individuals’ attitude toward life ex-
tension aﬀects mortality contingent claims. The intuition for their result is the
following one. When choosing his longevity eﬀort, the individual faces a free
rider problem; he believes that he is one among a multitude of agents and that
he cannot, by himself, inﬂuence the return of the annuity through his own sur-
vival. Since every individual from the same longevity risk category has the same
belief, the annuity return is eﬀectively modiﬁed. As will be shown in the rest
of the paper, the laissez-faire level of eﬀort is then generally too high compared
with the optimal one.9
We ﬁnally compare individuals’ laissez-faire allocations:
Proposition 1 When the annuity market is actuarially fair, the laissez-faire
allocation is such that:
(i) c1 = d1 > c2 = d2,
(ii) e1 < e2.
9In their paper, Becker and Philipson (1998) conclude that “if it is not too costly to control
most longevity-related behavior, private markets could almost internalize such external eﬀects”.
To do so, they propose to implement a Pigouvian tax on longevity, equal to the social cost of the
premium increase. We will see that, within the framework of our paper, using this mechanism
is not possible.
7Point (ii) is a direct consequence of (3) while point (i) follows from our
assumption of identical initial wealth. In this case, individuals with diﬀerent γi











which satisfy this equality are such that
c1 = d1 > c2 = d2.
2.3 The ﬁrst best problem
Assume that the social planner is utilitarian and that he perfectly observes in-























First order conditions of this problem can be rearranged as:10
u′  
di 












It follows that consumption should be equalized across time and across agents



























1, which reﬂects the impact of eﬀort on the budget set. This is what we call in
the rest of the paper the Becker-Philipson eﬀect (BP eﬀect): in the ﬁrst best,
the level of eﬀort is lower than in the laissez-faire so as to take into account that
longevity-enhancing behavior not only has an impact on the agent’s survival but
also on second period consumption possibilities through a tightened resource
10The Hessian of the problem is negative deﬁnite under our assumptions.
8constraint. Thus, at the optimal level of eﬀort, the marginal gain in utility due
to increased survival probability is equal to the total marginal cost of eﬀort, that
is the intensity of eﬀort disutility plus marginal decrease in utility due to smaller
consumption possibilities (see equation 4). This is summarized in the following
proposition:
Proposition 2 For any type of individual, the ﬁrst best level of eﬀort is distorted
downward with respect to the laissez-faire.




increases, the term inside brackets tends to one so that the ﬁrst best
level of eﬀort tends to the laissez-faire one.11 In other words, nothing is more
important than being alive (even if the individual is let with no resources in
the second period) and the BP eﬀect only plays a marginal role. On the other
hand, for smaller levels of the value of life (V L
 
di 
→ 0), life is worth living
only because it creates consumption opportunities in the second period. In this
case, the BP eﬀect is important and so is the diﬀerence between the ﬁrst best
and the laissez-faire levels of eﬀort.
Our second set of results concerns the allocation of consumptions and eﬀort
across individuals:
Proposition 3 Assume two groups of individuals, i = 1,2 with eﬀort disutility
such that γ1 > γ2. The ﬁrst best allocation is characterized by
(i) ci = di = ¯ c ∀i,
(ii) e1 < e2.
Point (i) is a direct consequence of both utilitarianism and of additivity across
periods in the individual’s lifetime utility. The social planner also requires less
eﬀort from the individual with higher disutility of eﬀort so that he ends up with
a smaller survival probability. Since the expected lifetime consumption of an
individual of type γi is equal to ci + π
 
ei 
di, one ﬁnds that this level is higher





















→ 0, this expression tends to one.
9for the low-disutility individual. Thus, the ﬁrst best optimum transfers resources
from low-survival individuals to high-survival ones.
Finally, we claim that this ﬁrst best allocation cannot be decentralized through
a simple tax-and-transfer scheme since eﬀort is not contractible.12 This is a di-
rect consequence of the non-monetary form of eﬀort and this explains why in
the following section we resort to a constrained ﬁrst best in which the social
planner lets individuals choose their eﬀort and can inﬂuence it only through the
allocation of consumptions.
3 Full information with non-contractible eﬀort
3.1 The optimum
Since eﬀort is not contractible, it is reasonable to assume that the social planner
has no control over it. Thus, we now assume that the social planner only allocates
consumptions, knowing that it may have consequences on individuals’ choice of
eﬀort. In this section, the social planner perfectly observes individuals’ types.
The timing of the problem is as follows. First, the social planner allocates
consumptions and, second, individuals choose their level of eﬀort. Proceeding by
backward induction, we ﬁrst solve the individual’s problem. For each individual
i = 1,2, it amounts to maximizing (1) with respect to eﬀort, taking as given the






− γi = 0 (6)
This deﬁnes the preferred level of eﬀort for this individual, which we denote
as e∗  
γi,di 
in the following. Not surprisingly, e∗  
γi,di 
is decreasing in γi
and increasing in di. Then, the social planner chooses consumption paths for




























12We thank an anonymous referee for suggesting the term “contractible”.


















where λ is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the resource constraint. With
non-contractible eﬀort, present consumption should now be higher than future
consumption. This is a direct consequence of both the BP eﬀect and of the
non-contractible form of eﬀort: here, the only way to make individuals exert less
eﬀort is to provide them with less second period consumption. This result is
summarized in the following proposition:
Proposition 4 Under full information with non-contractible eﬀort, ci > di for
any individual with type γi.
Substituting (7) into (8) and replacing the expression of ∂e∗  
γi,di 
/∂di, we








π(e∗ (γi,di))π′′ (e∗ (γi,di))
di
V L(di) + di (9)
For a high level of V L
 
di 
, the right-hand side tends to one so that ci and di
are close. In this case, the BP eﬀect only plays a marginal role so that there
is no need to encourage ﬁrst period consumption with respect to second period
consumption. On the contrary, if the value of life is small, this eﬀect is important
and the only way to correct for this ineﬃciency is to provide the individual with
much higher levels of ﬁrst period consumption.
We further study how consumptions should be allocated between individuals
with diﬀerent disutility from eﬀort. According to equation (7), ﬁrst period con-
sumption is equalized between individuals, ci = ¯ c ∀i. On the other hand, second
period consumption is diﬀerentiated since γi enters in the RHS of (8). Assuming
speciﬁc functional forms for π(e) such that επ,e is decreasing with eﬀort, we
show in Appendix B that second period consumption should be higher for the
low-disutility individual. This is stated formally in the following proposition.
11Proposition 5 Consider two groups of individuals with types γ1 and γ2 such
that γ1 > γ2. Under full information with non-contractible eﬀort,
(i) First period consumption is equalized across individuals, ci = ¯ c ∀i.
(ii) d1 < d2 when individuals’ survival probability is modeled as π(e) = loge or
π (e) = e/(1 + e).
In this set-up, the optimal allocation transfers resources from the high-
disutility, low-survival individual to the low-disutility, high-survival individual,











Let us now consider how to decentralize the above optimum. In the following,
we assume that instruments available to the social planner are individualized
linear taxes on savings, ti and individualized lump sum transfers, Ti. Under




individual’s problem is to maximize:
u
 
w − si  













= 1 + ti
Comparing this condition with (9), we ﬁnd that the ﬁrst best allocation can be





π (e∗ (γi,di))π′′ (e∗ (γi,di))
di
V L(di) + di > 0
Note that this tax is decreasing in the value of life. Indeed, a tax is required
only to correct for the ineﬃciency created by the BP eﬀect, which is smaller for




The ﬁrst best solution, as described by Proposition 5, can then be decen-
tralized using taxes on annuities such that the level of the tax is higher for the
12individual with high disutility from eﬀort, t1 > t2. One also needs lump sum
transfers from the low-survival toward the high-survival individual: T1 < T2.13
4 Asymmetric information with non-contractible ef-
fort
4.1 Theoretical results
We now assume that the social planner neither observes individuals’ disutility
from eﬀort nor their levels of eﬀort.14 In this case, if the social planner proposes
ﬁrst best bundles, the individual with high disutility from eﬀort (γ1) has an inter-
est in claiming to have low disutility and to enjoy higher future consumption.15






















































− γ1e∗  
γ1,d2 
We prove in Appendix C that the trade-oﬀs between two-period consumptions










π(e∗ (γ1,d1))π′′ (e∗ (γ1,d1))
d1












π(e∗ (γ2,d2))π′′ (e∗ (γ2,d2))
d2














13Note that in the special case of constant επ,e = ε, one has d
i = ¯ d ∀i. In this case, taxes are









We still have T
1 < T
2, but the size of these transfers is smaller than under decreasing elasticity.
14The social planner observes survival probabilities ex post but this does not give additional
information on types since survival can always be the result of luck and not because the indi-
vidual lied about his type.
15Note that, with constant elasticity, επ,e = ε, the ﬁrst best allocation is still implementable
under asymmetric information.
13where   is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the incentive constraint.
The ﬁrst terms on the right-hand side of (10) and of (11) are similar to (9)
and are greater than one. In (11), the additional term inside brackets results









. The trade-oﬀ between present and future con-
sumptions is then equivalent to the full information case for the type-1 individual.
This is a kind of “no distortion at the top” result for the mimicker. Conversely,
the second best allocation for a type-2 individual is now distorted downward
with respect to the full information case. Our results are summarized hereafter:
Proposition 6 Under asymmetric information with non-contractible eﬀort,
(i) there is no distortion at the top for individuals of type γ1 and c1 > d1,
(ii) the trade-oﬀ between two-period consumptions is distorted downward for in-
dividuals of type γ2 and c2 ≷ d2.
For the type γ1, there is no additional distortion compared with the ﬁrst
best and c1 > d1 simply to correct for the BP eﬀect. On the other hand,
the individual with low disutility from eﬀort now faces two distortions with
countervailing eﬀects. To see this, let us ﬁrst assume that there is no incentive
problem; in this case,   = 0 in (11) and c2 > d2 as a result of the BP eﬀect.
Let us then consider a standard problem of asymmetric information (  > 0)
where the BP eﬀect is null; in this case, c2 < d2. The intuition behind this
result is as follows. Since the mimicker has high disutility from eﬀort, he has
lower chances to survive to the second period so that he prefers smaller levels of
future consumption. It then makes sense to encourage future consumption for
the mimickee as a way to relax an otherwise binding self-selection constraint.
Later on in the paper, we call it the incentive eﬀect.
Thus, if the BP eﬀect dominates the incentive eﬀect, early consumption
should be encouraged with respect to future consumption for individual 2; yet,
the diﬀerence between present and future consumption will be lower than in the
full information case since the incentive eﬀect partly neutralizes the BP eﬀect.
14It is also possible that future consumption is preferred if the incentive eﬀect
dominates the BP eﬀect.
Finally, we study how to implement these results. Comparing (10) and (11)






π (e∗ (γ1,d1))π′′ (e∗ (γ1,d1))
d1







π (e∗ (γ2,d2))π′′ (e∗ (γ2,d2))
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 − 1 ≷ 0
This tax has the same form as in the full information case for the high-disutility
individual. Conversely, for the low-disutility individual, whether he faces a posi-
tive or negative tax now depends on the direction of the overall distortion. If the
BP eﬀect dominates the incentive eﬀect, a positive tax on annuities is desirable.
In the reverse case, he beneﬁts from a subsidy (negative tax) on annuities and
future consumption is encouraged.
In the next subsection, we simulate our model and study how the direction
of the overall distortion depends on the distance between types
 
γ1 − γ2 
and
on individuals’ preference parameters.
4.2 Numerical example
The objective of this section is to illustrate our previous theoretical results and
to evaluate the size of the second best distortion for the type-2 individual as a
function of the parameters of the model.




are distributed on ]0,1] and we set w = 10. The utility function
has the following form, u(c) = cε/ε with constant elasticity, ε. As a bench-
mark, we set ε = 0.2 and γ1 = 1. The survival probability is modeled as
π(e) = e/(1 + e) which ensures that it is always lower than one and that it has
decreasing elasticity. In the ﬁrst table, we present the values of consumptions,
15eﬀorts and survival probabilities for both types of individuals, under successively
full information (FI) and asymmetric information (AI):
c d e π(e)
u′(di)
u′(ci)
γ1 = 1 individual 1 FI 6.281 5.840 1.668 0.625 1.060
AI 6.956 6.475 1.695 0.629 1.059
γ2 = 0.9 individual 2 FI 6.281 5.874 1.814 0.645 1.055
AI 5.606 5.255 1.782 0.641 1.053
γ1 = 1 individual 1 FI 5.806 5.394 1.647 0.622 1.061
AI 6.694 6.229 1.685 0.628 1.059
γ2 = 0.1 individual 2 FI 5.806 5.710 7.417 0.881 1.013
AI 4.920 5.088 7.320 0.880 0.974
Table 1: Optimal allocations with non-contractible eﬀort
In the above table, we assume that individuals have either very similar or very
diﬀerent disutility from eﬀort. This table conﬁrms the ﬁndings of Proposition
5 that under full information, future consumption is always higher for type-2
individuals. These results are yet more interesting when we study the optimal
allocations under asymmetric information. First period consumption is no longer
smoothed between individuals and those with high disutility now get higher
present and future consumption levels; they also exert lower eﬀort but have
lower survival probability. In the last column, we present the distortion levels.
As expected, early consumption is always encouraged for type-1 individuals. For
type-2 individuals, we ﬁnd that the level of the distortion under asymmetric
information is always lower than under full information but whether it is greater
or lower than one depends on the distance between the γs. For very close levels of
the γs, the distortion is greater than one; the BP eﬀect dominates the incentive
eﬀect and early consumption is preferred. On the other hand, when individuals’
types are very diﬀerent, the distortion is lower than one and we observe the
reverse.
In order to verify our conjectures on the possible link between distance in
types and the size of the distortion, the following table gives the values of the
distortion for a type-2 individual when γ2 varies:





1.053 1.045 1.037 1.028 1.019 1.010 1.0 0.988 0.974
Table 2: Distortion levels for a type-2 individual under asymmetric information
As expected, the distance between types plays a crucial role in determining
the size of the distortion under asymmetric information. Indeed, for a given
level of the BP eﬀect, the higher the distance between types, the smaller the
overall distortion for a type-2 individual and the more likely it is to be lower
than one. The explanation is as follows. If the distance in types increases, so
does the diﬀerence between d1 and d2 in the ﬁrst best. In this case, the high-
disutility individual is more tempted to mimic the low-disutility individual and
the incentive eﬀect might be more “constraining”. From γ2 = 0.3, the incentive
eﬀect dominates the BP eﬀect, the overall distortion is smaller than one and
d2 > c2.
Another important determinant of the distortion for this individual is the




= (1 − ε)d2/ε. In the following table, we compute the distortion for
diﬀerent levels ε:16




0.08 1.25 1.64 18.86 0.78
0.1 2.40 2.71 24.38 0.90
0.2 5.33 5.20 20.80 1.02
0.3 6.29 5.77 13.46 1.06
0.5 6.90 5.50 5.50 1.12
0.6 7.10 5.02 3.35 1.15
Table 3: Second best distortions for a type-2 individual as a function of espilon
Note that the value of life is increasing in d2 and decreasing in ε, which
explains why, in the above table, the value of life is ﬁrst increasing and then
decreasing. Thus, when ε increases, the value of life decreases (not accounting
for the variation in consumption), so that the ineﬃciency created by the BP eﬀect
increases. This results in a higher level of the overall distortion. For ε   0.2,
16We assume γ
2 = 0.5.
17the BP eﬀect dominates the incentive eﬀect and ﬁrst period consumption is
encouraged.
5 Concluding Remarks
This paper studies an optimal taxation problem in which it is assumed that
individuals can inﬂuence their longevity by exerting eﬀorts. We ﬁrst highlight
the relations between eﬀort, survival probability and the annuity return and
show that, as in Becker-Philipson (1998), for any individual, the laissez-faire level
of eﬀort is too high compared with the ﬁrst best one. This ineﬃciency arises
because in the laissez-faire, the individual does not integrate the consequence of
higher eﬀort in his budget constraint. In this paper, we also assume that eﬀort
is non-monetary so that it is non-contractible. Thus, the individual privately
chooses his level of eﬀort while the social planner allocates consumptions. The
following table provides a summary of our results.
Consumptions Eﬀort Survival Proba.
Laissez-Faire c1 = d1 > c2 = d2
First Best c1 = d1 = c2 = d2
non-contractible, Full Info d1 < d2 < c1 = c2 e1 < e2 π1 < π2
non-contractible, Assym. Info
c1 > c2,d1 > d2,c1 > d1
c2 ≷ d2
Table 4: Recapitulative table
We further studied how to decentralize these optima through a tax-and-
transfer scheme. In our framework, under full information, it is optimal to tax
annuitized savings and the level of the tax should be higher for the individual
with higher disutility and thus lower survival. Under asymmetric information,
a tax on annuities is still desirable for this latter individual. It turns out that,
in some cases, it is optimal to subsidize savings for the individual with low
disutility and high survival. Whether savings should be taxed or subsidized
for this individual depends on whether the BP eﬀect or the incentive eﬀect
dominates.
There are several directions in which the model could be extended. First,
18one main message of this paper consists in taxing savings as a way to limit non-
monetary investments in longevity. This result might be somewhat surprising
and one might instead want to subsidize health investments. One clear reason is
that, generally, individuals with worse health conditions are also the ones with
lower resources so that subsidizing health for these agents is a way to redistrib-
ute income. Therefore, a ﬁrst extension would be to introduce diﬀerences in
wages; this would surely mitigate our results.17 A second direction is to make
life expectancy also depend on intrinsic characteristics (such as gender); since
eﬀorts and genetics may be correlated, how would this additional characteristic
modify our model? Finally, we assume additively separable preferences which
imply temporal risk neutrality. Relaxing this assumption may modify our results
substantially. Answering these questions is on our research agenda.
17Cremer et al. (2008) also justify health subsidization by invoking individuals myopia.
Individuals may consume “sin goods” in the ﬁrst periods of their life without realizing that it
will have negative consequences on their health. A paternalistic government would like to tax
sin goods and to subsidize health investments so as to compensate for the negative eﬀects of
these goods. In our model, individuals perfectly anticipate their longevity.
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21Appendix
A Value of life
Consider an individual with preferences similar to the ones described in Section
2. The only diﬀerence is that his survival probability now depends not only on a
non-monetary eﬀort, e but also on some monetary investment, m. His survival
probability is denoted π(m,e) and his problem amounts to choosing optimal
levels of consumptions in ﬁrst and second periods c and d as well as the optimal
levels of monetary and non-monetary eﬀorts:
maxu(c) + π(m,e)u(d) − γe
s.to c + π(m)d + m ≤ w
First order conditions yield
u′ (c) = u′ (d) = λ
πe (m,e)u(d) − γ = 0
πm(m,e)u(d) = λ[1 + πm (m,e)d]
Deﬁning the value of life as the price this individual would be ready to pay for
one additional unit of life, V L is simply equal to 1/πm (m,e). From the above,
we obtain (2).
B Full information with non-contractible eﬀort






























First order conditions with respect to ci and di are:
u′  
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which is negative, since ∂e∗  
γi,di 
/∂γi < 0. Thus, d1 < d2 for γ1 > γ2.














Again using the implicit function theorem, one obtains that ddi/dγi < 0 so that
d1 < d2 for γ1 > γ2.
Note ﬁnally that if π(e) has constant elasticity with respect to eﬀort, denoted














so that ﬁrst order condition on di is independent of individual’s types and d1 = d2
for γ1 > γ2.
23C Asymmetric information with non-contractible ef-
fort
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In expressions (16) and (17), we ﬁrst replace for the expression of ∂e∗  
γi,di 
/∂di
(see its expression in Appendix B). Then, we obtain (10) by substituting (14)
into (16). By the same procedure, we obtain (11) by substituting (15) into (17).
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